139 - Guadalcanal - Edson and the defence of Bloody Ridge

The Principles of War - Lessons from Military History on Strategy, Tactics, Doctrine and Leadership.

This is the fifth episode of our Guadalcanal series with historian and author Dave Holland.

This episodes discusses:

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Why was Henderson Field the single piece of decisive terrain on Guadalcanal? How did Edson know the main Japanese attack would come over the ridge, not the beach? What went wrong in Kawaguchi's three-pronged night attack on the Marine perimeter? How did fragile Guadalcanal logistics shape the tempo in September 1942? What made Edson's Ridge a natural avenue of approach to the airfield? How did the Tanambogo/Gavutu raider actions tip the Marines to Japanese intentions? What do Edson vs. Kawaguchi show about combat leadership in jungle/littoral fights? How did malaria, dysentery, and hunger blunt Marine combat power before the battle? Why did Vandegrift accept a thin, incomplete perimeter around Henderson Field? How did daily Japanese air raids limit Marine prep of the ridge before 12–14 Sept 1942?

Dave is an ex-Marine and was posted to Guadalcananal with the Australian Federal Police. He regularly leads battlefield study tours through the area. He is a world-leading expert on the battles of Guadalcanal and author of Guadalcanal's Longest Fight - The Pivotal Battles of the Matanikau Front.

Check out the show notes for this episode.